Vendor Register

DNS and domain services

Authoritative name resolution, domain registration and certificates: the addresses every other service is reached by.

How the register reads it

Also calledmanaged DNS, domain registrar, certificates
FamilyCloud and hosting
Default criticalityCritical when the paste gives none. A DNS failure takes every public service and most internal integrations offline at once, whoever hosts them.
DORA scopeAn ICT service: recorded in the register of information and reached by Articles 28 to 31.
Cloud serviceTreated as a cloud service: the exit provision is expected (ISO 27001 control 5.23) and its absence is a finding.
Contract focusRegistrar lock and transfer rights, zone export, availability, incident assistance.

What each regime attaches

26 clauses across 4 regimes

Shown on a register for the regimes you tick; with none ticked, the ISO 27001 rows are the default. Requirement text is our own statement of each clause, read from the published text and cited so you can check it against the official text; it is not the instrument verbatim.

DORA, the Digital Operational Resilience Act

Attaches to contractual arrangements for ICT services: cloud, software, network, managed services and data feeds. A supply of hardware, a bank or a courier is recorded in the register only where a service element sits in the contract.

DORA Art. 28 ICT third-party risk: general principles

Financial entities manage ICT third-party risk as part of ICT risk inside the ICT risk management framework, remain fully responsible for their obligations when they use ICT services, and apply proportionality according to the nature and importance of ICT dependencies and the criticality of each service. They keep a register of information on all ICT service...

Evidence an auditor accepts: Register of information on all ICT service arrangements at entity and consolidated level, flagging critical or important functions; Yearly report to the competent authority on new arrangements, provider categories, contract types and services, with submission confirmation; Pre-contract assessment files covering criticality, supervisory conditions, risk and concentration, due diligence and conflicts of interest
Common gap: Register omits intra-group or low-value ICT arrangements
Source framework: DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554)
DORA Art. 30 Key contractual provisions

Contracts set out the rights and obligations of both parties in one written document, available on paper or another durable, downloadable format, including the service levels. Every ICT services contract covers at least: the functions and services and whether and how subcontracting is permitted; service and data processing locations, with advance notice of c...

Evidence an auditor accepts: ICT service contracts held as a single written document that includes the service level agreement; Contract clause checklist per contract mapped to the Article 30(2) minimum elements; For critical or important functions: clauses on quantitative service targets, TLPT participation, unrestricted audit and access rights and exit transition periods
Common gap: Contract silent on data location changes or data return on termination
Source framework: DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554)
DORA RTS 2024/1773 Art. 8(1) and (2) Article 8(1) and (2): Written contracts with DORA clauses and audit and testing rights

Contracts must be in writing and include all elements of DORA Article 30(2) and (3), plus elements on Article 1(1)(a) and other relevant law. They must give the entity rights to access information, inspect, audit and test ICT, which it exercises through its own internal audit or an appointed third party and, where appropriate, pooled audits and pooled ICT te...

Evidence an auditor accepts: Executed written contracts with a DORA Article 30 clause mapping; Audit, inspection and testing right clauses; Audit plan for critical providers including pooled audits where used
Common gap: Contracts missing Article 30(3) clauses for critical services
Source framework: Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1773, the ICT third-party contractual policy
DORA RTS 2024/1773 Art. 9 Article 9: Monitoring of the contractual arrangements

The policy must require contracts to set measures and key indicators to monitor provider performance continuously, including data confidentiality, availability, integrity and authenticity and compliance with the entity's policies, and remedies such as contractual penalties when service levels are missed. It must specify how the entity checks that providers m...

Evidence an auditor accepts: KPI and key control indicator dashboards per critical provider; Provider reports on service delivery, security, incidents and continuity testing; Service level breach log and penalties applied
Common gap: Provider incident notifications not required by contract
Source framework: Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1773, the ICT third-party contractual policy
DORA Art. 29 Preliminary assessment of ICT concentration risk at entity level

When assessing ICT third-party arrangements supporting critical or important functions, financial entities shall assess ICT concentration risk, including the risks of contracting providers that are not easily substitutable or of multiple arrangements with the same or closely connected providers, and the implications of subcontracting.

Evidence an auditor accepts: ICT concentration-risk assessment for critical/important-function arrangements
Common gap: Concentration risk not assessed
Source framework: DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554)
DORA RTS 2024/1773 Art. 6 Article 6: Due diligence on prospective providers

The policy must set a proportionate selection and assessment process, noting whether the provider is intra-group, and require the entity to assess before contracting whether the provider has the reputation, abilities, expertise, financial, human and technical resources, security standards, organisation, risk management, internal controls and any required aut...

Evidence an auditor accepts: Due diligence questionnaire and assessment per prospective provider; Financial standing and reputation checks; Subcontracting and third-country location disclosures
Common gap: Due diligence relies on a single certification
Source framework: Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1773, the ICT third-party contractual policy
DORA RTS 2025/532 Art. 3(2) and (3) Article 3(2) and (3): Periodic reassessment and retained responsibility

Entities whose providers subcontract ICT services supporting critical or important functions must periodically repeat the assessments of Article 3(1)(f) to (j) in the light of changes in their business environment, supported functions, ICT threats, concentration and geopolitical risks. Relying on the provider's own assessment of its subcontractors does not l...

Evidence an auditor accepts: Periodic subcontracting reassessment records with dates; Triggers for reassessment such as geopolitical or concentration changes; Evidence of the entity's own review where provider assessments are used
Common gap: Reassessment never repeated after onboarding
Source framework: Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/532, ICT subcontracting
DORA Art. 31 Designation of critical ICT third-party service providers

The ESAs, through the Joint Committee, designate which ICT third-party service providers are critical, according to systemic impact, the importance of the institutions relying on them, reliance for critical or important functions and substitutability, and publish the list yearly; each designated provider gets a Lead Overseer and must tell the financial entit...

Evidence an auditor accepts: Dated cross-check of the entity's ICT provider register against the published list of critical providers; Designation notices received from providers; Evidence that any designated third-country provider in use has a Union subsidiary established within 12 months of designation
Common gap: Register not reconciled with the yearly ESA list
Source framework: DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554)

The NIS2 Directive

Attaches to every direct supplier and service provider of the entity, whatever it supplies; the depth of the assessment follows the access and the criticality.

NIS2 Art. 21(2)(d) Supply chain security, covering the relationship with each direct supplier and service provider

The Directive scopes this deliberately at direct suppliers and service providers, which makes the first artefact an inventory of who those parties are and which of them touch the network and information systems behind the service. From there the entity has to manage the security-related aspects of each relationship: what the supplier may access, what securit...

Evidence an auditor accepts: Inventory of direct suppliers and service providers, flagged for access to in-scope systems; Risk assessment per supplier proportionate to the access and criticality involved; Contractual security clauses, including incident notification obligations and audit or assurance rights
Common gap: Inventory built from the procurement system, so shadow and free-tier services are missing
Source framework: NIS2 Directive
NIS2 Art. 21(3) Take account of supplier-specific vulnerabilities and of Union coordinated supply chain risk assessments

Deciding what supply chain measures are appropriate is not left to general judgement. The entity has to take into account the vulnerabilities specific to each direct supplier and service provider, and the overall quality of those parties' products and cybersecurity practices including their secure development procedures. Separately, it must take into account...

Evidence an auditor accepts: Per-supplier assessment records that address that supplier's own vulnerabilities and secure development practice; A watch process for Union coordinated supply chain risk assessments and the outputs it has captured; Decision records showing how each relevant coordinated assessment was reflected in supplier measures
Common gap: Supplier assessment reduced to a questionnaire score with no view of that supplier's actual weaknesses
Source framework: NIS2 Directive
NIS2 Art. 24 Use certified ICT products, services and processes where the Member State requires it

A Member State may require essential and important entities to use particular ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes that are certified under a European cybersecurity certification scheme adopted under Article 49 of Regulation (EU) 2019/881, as a way of demonstrating compliance with particular Article 21 requirements. That requirement can arrive either...

Evidence an auditor accepts: A determination of whether any certification requirement applies, per Member State of jurisdiction; Certificates held for ICT products, services or processes where certification is required; The watch process for delegated acts and national requirements, with dated review
Common gap: Assuming no requirement applies without checking each national transposition
Source framework: NIS2 Directive

NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1

Attaches to every supplier, developer, integrator and service provider of a federal system, with the hardest controls on components and on privileged access.

SP 800-161 SR-6 Supplier Assessments and Reviews

Assesses and reviews suppliers, at a depth matched to what they supply and the access they hold.

Evidence an auditor accepts: assessment methodology and tiering by criticality; assessment records per supplier; review cycle evidence
Common gap: all suppliers assessed with the same questionnaire
Source framework: NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1
SP 800-161 SR-8 Notification Agreements

Establishes agreements requiring suppliers to notify the organization of compromise, vulnerability and relevant change.

Evidence an auditor accepts: notification clauses with defined triggers and timeframes; evidence of notifications received; escalation route when notification fails
Common gap: notification obligation absent or without a timeframe
Source framework: NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1
SP 800-161 SA-4 Acquisition Process

Puts security and supply chain requirements into the contract, including the evidence the supplier must provide.

Evidence an auditor accepts: contract templates carrying security and C-SCRM requirements; evidence of requirements in executed contracts; acceptance criteria tied to those requirements
Common gap: requirements in the template but absent from signed contracts
Source framework: NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1
SP 800-161 SR-13 Supplier Inventory

A control new in this publication: maintains an inventory of suppliers so that exposure to any one of them can actually be answered.

Evidence an auditor accepts: supplier inventory with the systems and components each supports; criticality attached to each supplier; update procedure on supplier change
Common gap: supplier list held by procurement with no link to systems
Source framework: NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1
SP 800-161 SA-9 External System Services

Governs external service providers across their life cycle, including the security roles each party holds.

Evidence an auditor accepts: inventory of external services; agreements defining security roles and responsibilities; monitoring and assessment evidence
Common gap: responsibilities assumed rather than defined
Source framework: NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1
SP 800-161 AC-20 Use of External Systems

Sets the terms under which organizational information may be processed on supplier and provider systems, and verifies them.

Evidence an auditor accepts: inventory of external systems used by suppliers for organizational data; agreements setting the security terms; verification evidence such as assessment or attestation
Common gap: supplier subcontracts processing with no notification
Source framework: NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1
SP 800-161 CA-3 Information Exchange

Governs the connections and exchanges between the organization and its suppliers, integrators and providers.

Evidence an auditor accepts: inventory of supply chain exchanges and connections; agreements documenting each; technical protections and review records
Common gap: connections established for a project and never decommissioned
Source framework: NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1
SP 800-161 IR-6 Incident Reporting

Reports supply chain incidents to the parties who need to know, including other users of the same supplier or component.

Evidence an auditor accepts: reporting thresholds and recipients including external bodies; records of reports made; evidence of onward notification where required
Common gap: reporting obligations to sector bodies unidentified
Source framework: NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1
SP 800-161 CP-2 Contingency Plan

Plans for continued operation when a critical supplier, integrator or component source becomes unavailable.

Evidence an auditor accepts: contingency plan with supplier failure scenarios; identification of critical suppliers and single points of failure; alternate sourcing arrangements
Common gap: plan lists systems but not the suppliers that keep them running
Source framework: NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1
SP 800-161 CP-4 Contingency Plan Testing

Tests the supply chain elements of the contingency plan, including whether alternate sources can actually deliver.

Evidence an auditor accepts: test plan including supplier failure scenarios; test results and lessons; evidence alternate sources were contacted or validated
Common gap: alternate supplier named but never approached
Source framework: NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1

ISO/IEC 27001:2022

Attaches to every supplier relationship through controls 5.19 to 5.23, and to outsourced development through 8.30. With no regime ticked, these rows render as the default.

ISO 27001 5.19 Information security in supplier relationships

Define and apply processes to manage the security risk suppliers introduce.

Evidence an auditor accepts: supplier_risk_assessment; contractual_security_requirements; supplier_security_monitoring
Common gap: Treating all suppliers as low risk
Source framework: ISO/IEC 27001:2022
ISO 27001 5.20 Addressing information security within supplier agreements

Establish and agree the relevant security requirements in each supplier contract.

Evidence an auditor accepts: contract_security_clauses; supplier_risk_assessment; security_incident_reporting
Common gap: missing explicit security clauses
Source framework: ISO/IEC 27001:2022
ISO 27001 5.22 Monitoring, review and change management of supplier services

Regularly monitor, review and manage change in supplier security practice and service delivery.

Evidence an auditor accepts: supplier_security_monitoring_reports; supplier_service_review_meetings; supplier_change_management_records
Common gap: relying on informal verbal updates
Source framework: ISO/IEC 27001:2022
ISO 27001 5.23 Information security for use of cloud services

Govern acquisition, use, management and exit of cloud services against your security requirements.

Evidence an auditor accepts: cloud_service_selection; cloud_contract_management; cloud_security_monitoring
Common gap: Relying solely on provider's security assurances
Source framework: ISO/IEC 27001:2022
ISO 27001 5.21 Managing information security in the ICT supply chain

Extend security requirements down the ICT products and services supply chain.

Evidence an auditor accepts: supplier_security_requirements; contractual_security_clauses; supply_chain_risk_assessments
Common gap: Treating supplier security as one-off check
Source framework: ISO/IEC 27001:2022

Findings this category can raise

Do this for every vendor on your list

Paste the list and get this classification for every vendor at once, with the share of spend and systems, the country it lands in, the criticality, the findings and the obligation rows per regime. Eight vendors free, no account.

Build my vendor register

Content delivery network · Infrastructure as a service