What else is geospatial and satellite data called?

satellite imagery, GIS data, geocoding.

How critical is a geospatial and satellite data vendor by default?

Standard when the paste gives no rating: Reports and routing degrade; several providers cover the same ground and switching is a data-mapping task. The register raises it to critical when the vendor is the only source and touches two or more systems, or touches three or more.

Which obligations attach to a geospatial and satellite data vendor?

DORA: DORA Art. 28, DORA Art. 30; NIS2: NIS2 Art. 21(2)(d); SP 800-161: SP 800-161 SR-6, SP 800-161 SR-8, SP 800-161 SA-4, SP 800-161 SR-13, SP 800-161 SA-9, SP 800-161 CA-3; ISO 27001: ISO 27001 5.19, ISO 27001 5.20, ISO 27001 5.22.

Which contract clauses does the register look for on a geospatial and satellite data contract?

Licence scope and derived-data rights, update cadence, accuracy commitments, format on exit, beside the clauses each ticked regime expects on every vendor agreement.

Every vendor category · Data and content

Geospatial and satellite data

Maps, imagery, addresses and location feeds that route, verify and monitor the physical world the business operates in.

How the register reads it

Also called	satellite imagery, GIS data, geocoding
Family	Data and content
Default criticality	Standard when the paste gives none. Reports and routing degrade; several providers cover the same ground and switching is a data-mapping task. Raised to critical when the vendor is the only source and touches two or more systems, or touches three or more.
DORA scope	An ICT service: recorded in the register of information and reached by Articles 28 to 31.
Contract focus	Licence scope and derived-data rights, update cadence, accuracy commitments, format on exit.

What each regime attaches

12 clauses across 4 regimes

Shown on a register for the regimes you tick; with none ticked, the ISO 27001 rows are the default. Requirement text drawn from a human-verified compliance corpus under licence: the corpus statement of each clause, not the instrument verbatim.

DORA, the Digital Operational Resilience Act

Attaches to contractual arrangements for ICT services: cloud, software, network, managed services and data feeds. A supply of hardware, a bank or a courier is recorded in the register only where a service element sits in the contract.

DORA Art. 28 ICT third-party risk: general principles

Financial entities shall manage ICT third-party risk as an integral component of ICT risk, maintain a Register of Information on all contractual arrangements for the use of ICT services, report it to competent authorities, assess risk before entering arrangements (including concentration and subcontracting), and adopt an ICT third-party risk strategy.

Evidence an auditor accepts: A Register of Information of ICT third-party arrangements reported to the competent authority; Pre-contract risk assessment records
Common gap: No Register of Information
Source framework: DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554)

DORA Art. 30 Key contractual provisions

Contractual arrangements for the use of ICT services shall include the mandatory key contractual provisions (e.g. clear service descriptions, locations of data processing, data protection, accessibility/availability/integrity/security, assistance on incidents, audit and access rights, termination rights and exit strategies), with enhanced provisions for serv...

Evidence an auditor accepts: ICT contracts containing the mandatory key provisions (audit/access, termination, exit, security); Enhanced provisions for critical/important-function services
Common gap: Contracts missing audit/access, termination or exit provisions
Source framework: DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554)

The NIS2 Directive

Attaches to every direct supplier and service provider of the entity, whatever it supplies; the depth of the assessment follows the access and the criticality.

NIS2 Art. 21(2)(d) Supply chain security, covering the relationship with each direct supplier and service provider

The Directive scopes this deliberately at direct suppliers and service providers, which makes the first artefact an inventory of who those parties are and which of them touch the network and information systems behind the service. From there the entity has to manage the security-related aspects of each relationship: what the supplier may access, what securit...

Evidence an auditor accepts: Inventory of direct suppliers and service providers, flagged for access to in-scope systems; Risk assessment per supplier proportionate to the access and criticality involved; Contractual security clauses, including incident notification obligations and audit or assurance rights
Common gap: Inventory built from the procurement system, so shadow and free-tier services are missing
Source framework: NIS2 Directive

NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1

Attaches to every supplier, developer, integrator and service provider of a federal system, with the hardest controls on components and on privileged access.

SP 800-161 SR-6 Supplier Assessments and Reviews

Assesses and reviews suppliers, at a depth matched to what they supply and the access they hold.

Evidence an auditor accepts: assessment methodology and tiering by criticality; assessment records per supplier; review cycle evidence
Common gap: all suppliers assessed with the same questionnaire
Source framework: NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1

SP 800-161 SR-8 Notification Agreements

Establishes agreements requiring suppliers to notify the organization of compromise, vulnerability and relevant change.

Evidence an auditor accepts: notification clauses with defined triggers and timeframes; evidence of notifications received; escalation route when notification fails
Common gap: notification obligation absent or without a timeframe
Source framework: NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1

SP 800-161 SA-4 Acquisition Process

Puts security and supply chain requirements into the contract, including the evidence the supplier must provide.

Evidence an auditor accepts: contract templates carrying security and C-SCRM requirements; evidence of requirements in executed contracts; acceptance criteria tied to those requirements
Common gap: requirements in the template but absent from signed contracts
Source framework: NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1

SP 800-161 SR-13 Supplier Inventory

A control new in this publication: maintains an inventory of suppliers so that exposure to any one of them can actually be answered.

Evidence an auditor accepts: supplier inventory with the systems and components each supports; criticality attached to each supplier; update procedure on supplier change
Common gap: supplier list held by procurement with no link to systems
Source framework: NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1

SP 800-161 SA-9 External System Services

Governs external service providers across their life cycle, including the security roles each party holds.

Evidence an auditor accepts: inventory of external services; agreements defining security roles and responsibilities; monitoring and assessment evidence
Common gap: responsibilities assumed rather than defined
Source framework: NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1

SP 800-161 CA-3 Information Exchange

Governs the connections and exchanges between the organization and its suppliers, integrators and providers.

Evidence an auditor accepts: inventory of supply chain exchanges and connections; agreements documenting each; technical protections and review records
Common gap: connections established for a project and never decommissioned
Source framework: NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1

ISO/IEC 27001:2022

Attaches to every supplier relationship through controls 5.19 to 5.23, and to outsourced development through 8.30. With no regime ticked, these rows render as the default.

ISO 27001 5.19 Information security in supplier relationships

Define and apply processes to manage the security risk suppliers introduce.

Evidence an auditor accepts: supplier_risk_assessment; contractual_security_requirements; supplier_security_monitoring
Common gap: Treating all suppliers as low risk
Source framework: ISO/IEC 27001:2022

ISO 27001 5.20 Addressing information security within supplier agreements

Establish and agree the relevant security requirements in each supplier contract.

Evidence an auditor accepts: contract_security_clauses; supplier_risk_assessment; security_incident_reporting
Common gap: missing explicit security clauses
Source framework: ISO/IEC 27001:2022

ISO 27001 5.22 Monitoring, review and change management of supplier services

Regularly monitor, review and manage change in supplier security practice and service delivery.

Evidence an auditor accepts: supplier_security_monitoring_reports; supplier_service_review_meetings; supplier_change_management_records
Common gap: relying on informal verbal updates
Source framework: ISO/IEC 27001:2022

Findings this category can raise

Single-source vendors with no fallback named
The paste marks these vendors as the only source and names no fallback. Every regime treats that as the concentration it exists to surface: the question is what happens on the day the vendor is unavailable, and who has written the answer down.
Concentration at or above the threshold
One vendor carrying a quarter or more of the spend, the top three carrying sixty percent or more, or one country carrying half or more: the register names the share so the dependence is a recorded one. Concentration is often the right commercial choice; the regimes ask that it be assessed, not avoided.
Contracts ending inside 90 days with no re-tender noted
A contract end inside ninety days of the as-at date, with no re-tender, renewal or extension recorded in the paste. Ninety days is shorter than most exit plans and most procurement cycles; the finding lists the days left beside each vendor.
DORA register-of-information fields missing
DORA asks financial entities to keep a register of information on every contractual arrangement for ICT services, in the columns the supervisory authorities' template sets: identification, type of service, the function it supports, criticality, country of provision, substitutability, sub-outsourcing and the exit plan. These vendors are ICT services in that sense and one or more of those columns is blank.
NIS2 supplier assessment not evidenced
The Directive asks an essential or important entity to manage the security of each direct supplier relationship and to take account of each supplier's own vulnerabilities and practices. These vendors touch in-scope systems and the paste carries no assessment date for them: the assessment may exist, but the register cannot show it.
Sub-outsourcing chains longer than one hop
The paste names a chain of two or more parties beneath a vendor. Each hop is a relationship the buyer has no contract with; DORA asks for the chain in the register, NIS2 asks that the supplier's own suppliers be considered, and the notification duty has to run the whole length of it.

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